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The recommodification of healthcare? A case study of user charges and inequalities in 1 
access to healthcare in Sweden 1980-2005 2 
Abstract 3 
Background: User charges in Swedish healthcare have increased during recent decades. 4 
This can be seen in terms of the recommodification of healthcare: making healthcare access 5 
more dependent on market position. This study investigates whether the increase in user 6 
charges had an impact on educational inequalities in access to healthcare in Sweden between 7 
1980 and 2005. 8 
Methods: Data from the Swedish Living Conditions Survey were used to calculate the 9 
odds ratios of access to healthcare for the low and higher educated in Sweden, and the results 10 
were stratified by health status (Good and Not good health) for each year 1980-2005. These 11 
odds ratios were correlated with the average user charge for healthcare. 12 
Results: There were no educational differences in healthcare access in the group with 13 
Good health. In the group with Not good health, the higher educated had higher rates of 14 
healthcare access than the lower educated. Inequalities in access to healthcare were relatively 15 
stable over time, with a slight increase among those with Not good health.  16 
Discussion: Recommodification has had only a small association with access to 17 
healthcare in Sweden. The Swedish system has integral protections that protect the vulnerable 18 
against rising healthcare costs. This is an important caveat for other countries that are 19 
considering introducing or raising user charges. 20 
Introduction 21 
Access to healthcare is a well-recognised social determinant of health [1], and 22 
inequalities in access to healthcare exacerbate problems caused by wider social inequalities 23 
[2]. Access to healthcare affects inequalities in avoidable mortality, which is defined as the 24 
number of deaths that could be avoided through the timely application of medical care. There 25 
are significant socio-economic inequalities in avoidable mortality across Europe [3]. 26 
Healthcare usage is lower in lower socio-economic groups, even though their health needs are 27 
higher [4]. European healthcare systems have been substantially reformed during the past few 28 
decades. The reforms largely served to increase the market’s role in healthcare provision, and 29 
have included changes to system financing (away from general taxation and social insurance), 30 
2 
 
the introduction of direct purchasing arrangements (an increase in co-payments and user 1 
charges), and changes in the organisation of service provision (privatisation, outsourcing and 2 
marketization of services) [5]. It can be argued that such reforms have recommodified 3 
healthcare – making access more dependent on an individual’s ability to pay, and thus largely 4 
on his or her labour market position. Many have speculated on the impact of such changes, 5 
but little research has been carried out into how recommodification has affected inequalities in 6 
access to healthcare [5]. The research that has been carried out has not employed a theoretical 7 
framework of recommodification. This paper presents a case study of reforms in the Swedish 8 
healthcare system and examines longitudinally the association between increases in user 9 
charges and inequalities in healthcare access between 1980 and 2005. It also examines 10 
whether recommodification has taken place. 11 
Healthcare Reform as the Recommodification of Health 12 
Over the last 25 years, the healthcare systems of most European countries have 13 
experienced extensive – and commonly market-based – organisational and financial reforms. 14 
These changes have been remarkably similar between different countries and under 15 
successive governments, regardless of their political affiliation. The emphasis has 16 
unswervingly been on promoting choice, competition and the role of markets in healthcare. 17 
The stated aims have been improving quality, stimulating innovation and promoting equity. 18 
Critics of the reforms have consistently questioned whether these aims have been achieved, 19 
contesting the evidence base for them and arguing that the reforms increase inequalities in 20 
access and reduce quality [5]. This has affected healthcare systems of different types, 21 
including national health systems (as in Sweden and the UK) and social insurance ones (as in 22 
Germany and France) [6].  23 
Sweden has strong local government with tax-raising capabilities [7]. The 20 county 24 
councils own and run both hospitals and primary care clinics, although some county councils 25 
have sold their primary care clinics to the private sector [7, 8]. User charges were set centrally 26 
until 1991, when the decision was devolved to the local level. At the same time, choice 27 
reforms were implemented by many county councils [9, 10]. Between 1970 and 1998, user 28 
charges in healthcare increased faster than the consumer price index [11]. The average user 29 
charge for a visit to the primary care system is roughly 200 SEK and the charge for outpatient 30 
specialist care is roughly 350 SEK [12].  31 
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These reforms can be seen as part of a process of recommodifying the welfare state. The 1 
expansion of the welfare state and the incorporation of social rights into the model of 2 
citizenship that occurred during the post-war period resulted in a significant 3 
decommodification of health [13]. “Decommodification” refers to the extent to which 4 
individuals and families are able to maintain an acceptable standard of living, regardless of 5 
their market position [14]. Welfare states decommodify by providing both cash transfers and 6 
public services. Although transfers have received the most attention, Bambra [15] applied the 7 
concept to healthcare and constructed a healthcare decommodification index based on the 8 
proportion of private funding, the proportion of private provision of healthcare, and the rates 9 
of public coverage. “Healthcare decommodification”, therefore, refers to the degree of market 10 
involvement in healthcare. In more decommodified healthcare systems (largely national 11 
health systems), the role of markets is minimised and access to services is usually a right of 12 
citizenship. Markets are not simply another method of service delivery: for a market to work, 13 
there must be a commodity [16]. The establishment of market mechanisms in healthcare thus 14 
commodifies healthcare – or in a historical sense, recommodifies it [16]. The healthcare 15 
reforms in Europe since the 1980s must be understood within a wider context of the 16 
recommodification of labour and the retrenchment of social citizenship, and as part of a wider 17 
neoliberal project to rebalance the relationship between labour and capital [17].  18 
Case Study: User Charges in Sweden  19 
User charges are one example of the commodifying character of recent healthcare 20 
reforms and one with particular implications for equity in healthcare. The use of user charges 21 
to make up the shortfall in tax financing can be considered to be an extra tax on the ill [18]. 22 
Furthermore, vulnerable groups such as people on low incomes, single parents, unemployed 23 
people, and social assistance recipients are more likely to be price-sensitive than other groups, 24 
thus exacerbating socio-economic inequalities in healthcare access and consequently in health 25 
outcomes amenable to healthcare [11, 19]. There is evidence from both the US and European 26 
countries (France, Italy and Germany) that user charges have a greater impact on healthcare in 27 
low-income groups [20, 21]. A recent review [5] found that market-style reforms, and 28 
especially reforms to payment methods (increased use of out-of-pocket payments and private 29 
health insurance) in healthcare reduce equity, while evidence regarding the marketization of 30 
service provision is less conclusive.  31 
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User charges mainly act to control consumption, and contribute a very little to financing 1 
the healthcare system in Sweden [11]. A limit to the charges that any single user pays in any 2 
one calendar year has been implemented to avoid placing an undue burden on the chronically 3 
ill: once a person has reached the limit, any further healthcare during that year is free [21].  4 
The Swedish healthcare system had a pro-poor bias during the 1980s, and people on low 5 
incomes were more likely to visit the doctor. By the 1990s, however, there was no difference 6 
in consumption rates by income [19, 22]. Similarly, in 1988/89 there were no significant 7 
differences in reported unmet care needs, while by 1996/97 the people in the lower-income 8 
quintiles had higher odds of reporting having care needs for which they had not sought help 9 
[22].  10 
Economic reasons are cited by almost 20% of those who have refrained from seeking 11 
needed care [23]. More people in disadvantaged areas than in prosperous ones report that they 12 
have not sought needed care for economic reasons [19] 13 
Since charges are frequently advanced as justification for not seeking medical care, such 14 
charges may be a major cause of inequality in healthcare access. This hypothesis led us to 15 
investigate the link between charges and determining access to healthcare. In particular, we 16 
have investigated whether user charges in the Swedish healthcare system are associated with 17 
inequalities in seeking care by educational level, and if so, to what extent. We have compared 18 
educational inequalities in access to healthcare before and after the 1991 increase in user 19 
charges, and tracked the developments in inequalities and charges until 2005.  20 
This paper uses the Swedish experience as a case study, and (1) examines the 21 
association between user charges for healthcare consultations and educational inequalities in 22 
access to healthcare, both for the general population and for those with the highest health 23 
needs, and (2) frames this discussion within a discussion of the process of the 24 
recommodification of healthcare. We argue that user charges are a recommodification of 25 
healthcare, and, as such, are linked to increased educational inequalities in healthcare access. 26 
This is because such charges have the greatest effect for people of lower socio-economic 27 
status, who have less resources [19, 22].      28 
Methods 29 
The data used in this study were taken from the Swedish Survey on Income and Living 30 
Conditions (ULF) from 1980 to 2005. ULF became part of the EU-SILC project (European 31 
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Union Survey of Income and Living Conditions) in 2005, and was modified such that the 1 
outcome variable of interest to us (healthcare visits during the preceding three months) 2 
became available. ULF is a cross-sectional study that interviews between 5500 and 7500 3 
participants each year. In total, 114,227 participants have been included in the analysis. Due 4 
to a lack of information on prices, the years 1982-1987 and 1990 have been excluded from the 5 
analysis. 6 
Healthcare usage was measured by the question “Have you at any point during the past 7 
three months visited a doctor?” and was coded into a dichotomous variable with the answers 8 
“Yes” or “No”. This question is worded very broadly, since different counties have different 9 
arrangements with regards to seeking care: in some counties primary care serves as a strict 10 
gatekeeper to hospital care, whereas in others it is possible to make appointments directly 11 
with hospital specialists. Asking whether someone has sought care at a specific level (such as 12 
primary care or secondary care) would thus bias the result. The variable thus measures any 13 
kind of healthcare usage. 14 
Socio-economic status was measured by education, coded into three categories: “Low” 15 
(no qualifications, or solely compulsory school qualification), “Intermediate” (upper 16 
secondary school qualification or equivalent), and “High” (degree qualification or above). The 17 
analyses compared the lowest educated with the highest, with the highest educational group as 18 
the reference category. The highest educated are called Group A, and the lowest Group B. By 19 
comparing the two extremes to each other, the pattern of inequalities is seen most clearly, 20 
even though some nuance of the gradient is lost. Since health status influences the frequency 21 
of visits to doctors, and health status is influenced by social status, the relation between social 22 
status and healthcare access may be confounded by the intermediate variable, health status. 23 
This led us to run the analysis three times – once without accounting for health status, once 24 
selecting only respondents with self-reported Not good health (Fair, Poor or Very poor), and 25 
once selecting only respondents with self-reported Good health (Good or Very good). The 26 
effect of the difference in care-seeking behaviour due to differences in need was thus reduced. 27 
The measure of need, however, was rather crude, and the method did not entirely remove the 28 
effects of the differences. The higher educated with Good health we called Group A1, and 29 
those with Not good health we called A2. Similarly, the lower educated with Good health 30 
were called B1, and those with Not good health were called B2. 31 
 Higher educated Lower educated 
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Good health A1 B1 
Not good health A2 B2 
 1 
The data were analysed in two stages. In stage 1, we calculated rates of inequality in 2 
access to healthcare over time, and in stage 2, we investigated the correlation between 3 
inequalities in access to healthcare and the user charge of a healthcare visit. In stage 1, odds 4 
ratios were computed for the probability of having visited a doctor during the preceding three 5 
months. We considered a two stage model because the recommodification data is only 6 
available as a single data point per time. Note that this is a repeated cross-sectional data with 7 
different participants at each time and with no information on clusters that can be specified as 8 
random effects in a multilevel model. Since this procedure involves multiple comparisons, it 9 
increases the risk of a Type 1 error. The multiplicity adjustment method known as “False 10 
Discovery Rate” was used to combat this risk [24]. 11 
In stage 2, the inequalities found in stage 1 were then examined for any correlation to 12 
the user charge of a primary care visit in the Swedish healthcare system using linear 13 
regression with the (log)odds ratios found in stage 1 as the dependent variable and user 14 
charges for healthcare as the independent variable. Since each county council can set its own 15 
rates, the average cost was used. These data were provided by the Swedish Association of 16 
Local Authorities and Regions for the period 1980-2005. However, very limited data is 17 
available from before 1991, and data are available only for 1980, 1981, 1988, and 1989. 18 
Inflation was controlled for by converting prices into 1991 value SEK. We adjusted for time-19 
varying effects by including the year as a control variable in the analysis. Since the changes in 20 
the composition of the groups may have introduced bias in the association between education 21 
and health inequalities, we also controlled for the proportion of higher educated in the 22 
population. 23 
Results 24 
Table 1 shows the number and proportion of higher educated and lower educated 25 
respondents each year, as well as the number and proportion of respondents with Good and 26 
Not good health, respectively. 27 
  28 
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Table 1: Frequencies and proportions of high, intermediate and lower educated, and frequencies 1 
and proportions of Good and Not good health for each year in the study population. 2 
Year Higher education 
Intermediate 
education 
Lower education Good health Not good health 
 
n % n % n % n % n % 
1980 979 13.50% 2187 30.20% 4081 56.30% 5158 71.10% 2096 28.90% 
1981 1109 14.40% 2457 32% 4119 53.60% 5539 71.90% 2158 28% 
1982 1096 15% 2921 40.10% 3267 44.90% 5555 76.30% 1721 23.60% 
1983 1079 16.20% 2636 39.60% 2941 44.20% 5057 76.10% 1592 23.90% 
1984 1225 17% 2875 39.90% 3101 43.10% 5481 76.20% 1711 23.80% 
1985 1146 17.40% 2617 39.80% 2807 42.70% 5005 76.20% 1560 23.80% 
1986 899 18.90% 1946 40.80% 1920 40.30% 3656 76.70% 1110 23.20% 
1987 1304 18.50% 2821 40.10% 2908 41.30% 5282 75.10% 1748 24.90% 
1989 1308 20.20% 2624 40.60% 2539 39.20% 4893 75.70% 1574 24.30% 
1990 1294 20.90% 2657 43% 2228 36.10% 4635 75.10% 1535 24.90% 
1991 1259 21.70% 2541 43.70% 2012 34.60% 4397 75.70% 1404 24.20% 
1992 1408 23.60% 2636 44.10% 1930 32.30% 4339 72.70% 1632 27.30% 
1993 1482 24% 2718 44% 1981 32% 4472 72.40% 1698 27.50% 
1994 1538 25.70% 2531 42.30% 1917 32% 4540 75.90% 1445 24.10% 
1995 1427 23.80% 2618 43.60% 1957 32.60% 4500 75% 1497 25% 
1996 1365 23.30% 2667 45.50% 1825 31.20% 4520 76.80% 1367 23.20% 
1997 1460 25.20% 2625 45.30% 1712 29.50% 4497 77.50% 1305 22.50% 
1998 1473 25.70% 2644 46.10% 1613 28.20% 4407 77% 1318 23% 
1999 1547 27% 2585 45.10% 1595 27.90% 4307 75.20% 1417 24.80% 
2000 1544 27.20% 2627 46.30% 1506 26.50% 4305 75.80% 1374 24.20% 
2001 1591 27.40% 2683 46.30% 1522 26.30% 4272 73.70% 1527 26.30% 
2002 1850 31% 2557 42.90% 1559 26.10% 4408 73.90% 1556 26.10% 
2003 1862 30.90% 2510 41.70% 1650 27.40% 4481 74.30% 1548 25.70% 
2004 1784 32% 2405 43.10% 1390 24.90% 4094 73.30% 1488 26.70% 
2005 2919 27.20% 4837 46.30% 2441 26.50% 7806 75.80% 2495 24.20% 
 3 
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The proportion of people with higher education increased substantially over the course 1 
of the study period, from about 14% to 27%, while the proportion of people with intermediate 2 
education increased from 30% to 46%. The proportion of people with lower education 3 
decreased from 56% to 27% over the course of the study. The proportion of the population 4 
with Good health increased slightly from 71% to 76%, and the proportion with Not good 5 
health decreased correspondingly. 6 
Table 2 shows the respondents that reported having visited a doctor during the past three 7 
months for Groups A and B. The lowest educated were always more likely to have visited a 8 
doctor, but the difference was greater in the 1980s than in the 1990s. The rates of healthcare 9 
visits in Group A increased from 28% in 1980 to 36% in 2005. However, the rates in Group B 10 
were at 42% in both 1980 and 2005. The absolute rate difference in healthcare use between 11 
Groups A and B decreased with time, and was thus lower in the mid-2000s than in the 1980s. 12 
The relative rate ratio, however, fluctuated between 1.35 and 1.21 during the 1990s, and 13 
became slightly smaller during the 2000s. Those with lower education were more likely to 14 
visit the GP than the higher educated, but the difference decreased over the study period. 15 
  16 
9 
 
Table 2: Proportion of people who have visited a doctor during the past three months in Sweden, 1 
absolute rate difference and relative rate ratios between groups A (highest educated) and B (lowest 2 
educated). 3 
Year Highest educated 
(Group A) 
Lowest educated 
(Group B) 
Absolute rate 
difference (B-A) 
Relative rate 
ratio (A/B) 
1980 
1981 
1988 
1989 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
27.8% 
30.1% 
29.9% 
27.5% 
30.2% 
34.2% 
35.8% 
33.2% 
32.5% 
30.4% 
30.6% 
36.3% 
34.0% 
36.1% 
36.8% 
33.5% 
35.0% 
34.9% 
35.6% 
41.9% 
42.4% 
40.4% 
37.2% 
37.4% 
40.2% 
38.4% 
39.7% 
41.8% 
40.1% 
38.7% 
41.7% 
41.0% 
40.0% 
41.6% 
43.7% 
42.3% 
42.2% 
42.1% 
14.1 
12.3 
10.5 
9.7 
7.2 
6.0 
2.6 
6.5 
9.3 
9.7 
8.1 
5.4 
7.0 
3.9 
4.8 
10.2 
7.3 
7.3 
6.5 
1.51 
1.41 
1.35 
1.35 
1.24 
1.18 
1.07 
1.20 
1.29 
1.32 
1.26 
1.15 
1.21 
1.11 
1.13 
1.30 
1.21 
1.21 
1.18 
 4 
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 1 
Table 3 presents the results from stage 1 of the analysis, in the form of odds ratios and 2 
95% confidence intervals for having made a visit to the doctor during the past three months 3 
(using the highest educated as reference category) for the same time period. We stratified the 4 
results by health status. When we looked at the entire population, the lowest educated were 5 
slightly more likely than the highest educated to have visited the doctor, as Table 2 confirms. 6 
There were no significant differences in healthcare access by education in those with Good 7 
health, than is between groups A1 and B1. However, when we looked at those rating their 8 
health as Not good, the highest educated (group A2) were more likely than their less educated 9 
counterparts (group B2) to have visited the doctor. This means that part of the higher 10 
propensity for the low-educated to seek healthcare was due to their poorer health status, and 11 
when this was accounted for, they were less likely to seek care. 12 
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Table 3: The odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals of the likelihood of a doctor visit in the last 3 months by 1 
education, using the group of highest educated (group A) as reference and lowest education (B) as comparison, in the 2 
entire population and stratified by health status. Group A1 is those with highest education with Good health and 3 
Group A2 is those with highest education with Not good health. 4 
Year of 
survey 
Entire population (Group 
A as reference) 
Good health (Group A1 
as reference) 
Not good health (Group A2 
as reference) 
 
OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI 
1980 1.3 (1.11, 1.54) 1.02 (0.85, 1.24) 1.12 (0.73, 1.69) 
1981 1.2 (1.03, 1.40) 1.14 (0.95, 1.37) 0.43 (0.27, 0.66) 
1988 1.27 (1.09, 1.48) 1.12 (0.93, 1.35) 0.59 (0.40, 0.89) 
1989 1.24 (1.06, 1.44) 1.14 (0.95, 1.36) 0.63 (0.43, 0.91) 
1991 1.22 (1.04, 1.42) 1.03 (0.86, 1.23) 0.98 (0.69, 1.38) 
1992 1.14 (0.99, 1.33) 0.94 (0.78, 1.12) 0.91 (0.66, 1.24) 
1993 0.94 (0.81, 1,09) 0.84 (0.70, 1.01) 0.65 (0.48, 0.87) 
1994 1.15 (1.00, 1.33) 0.97 (0.81, 1.15) 0.75 (0.54, 1.05) 
1995 1.26 (1.09, 1.45) 1.08 (0.90, 1.29) 0.78 (0.56, 1.09) 
1996 1.25 (1.07, 1.40) 1.08 (0.90, 1.30) 0.94 (0.67, 1.34) 
1997 1.2 (1.03, 1.40) 0.93 (0.77, 1.12) 1.01 (0.71, 1.42) 
1998 1.1 (0.95, 1.28) 1 (0.83, 1.19) 0.73 (0.51, 1.03) 
1999 1.24 (1.06, 1.43) 1.08 (0.90, 1.29) 0.93 (0.67, 1.27) 
2000 1.08 (0.93, 1.26) 0.94 (0.79, 1.13) 0.84 (0.60, 1.17) 
2001 1.07 (0.92, 1.24) 1.03 (0.86, 1.23) 0.54 (0.39, 0.75) 
2002 1.4 (1.22, 1.62) 1.25 (1.05, 1.50) 0.98 (0.72, 1.34) 
2003 1.24 (1.08, 1.43) 1.15 (0.97, 1.37) 0.74 (0.55, 1.01) 
2004 1.17 (1.01, 1.41) 0.94 (0.78, 1.14) 0.91 (0.66, 1.24) 
2005 1.19 (1.01, 1.42) 0.98 (0.80, 1.21) 1.04 (0.72, 1.51) 
 5 
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 1 
Excepting 1980, the difference between the high-educated and low-educated in the 2 
propensity to seek care was greater in the 1980s than in the 1990s and 2000s in those with Not 3 
good health. This means that the inequalities between groups A2 and B2 were greater during 4 
the 1980s.  5 
Table 3 shows that in the total population, the lowest educated were consistently more 6 
likely to have visited a doctor, and this does not change over the years. Similarly, the odds 7 
ratios between group A1 and B1 (those with Good health) hovered around 1. In the group 8 
with Not good health, the change is in the opposite direction from that expected: the 9 
difference between groups A2 and B2 was greater in the 1980s, and diminished during the 10 
1990s and early 2000s, despite the increase in user charges. By the end of our analysis period 11 
in 2005, there were no significant differences in the propensity to seek healthcare, even in the 12 
population with Not good health. 13 
 14 
Figure 1: Mean user charge for a primary care visit in 1991 value SEK 15 
Figure 1 shows the trend in user charges in the Swedish healthcare system, converted to 16 
1991 value SEK to adjust for inflation. The main increase occurred between 1989 and 1991. 17 
Most of the increase after 1991 occurred from 2008 onwards, for which we lack appropriate 18 
data about patient behaviour.  19 
13 
 
Table 4 shows the results from stage 2 of the analysis, in the form of correlations 1 
between the average user charge of a healthcare visit in 1991 SEK, and the log (odds ratio) 2 
from stage 1 of having visited a doctor during the past three months for the entire population, 3 
Group A and Group B. 4 
14 
 
Table 4: Linear regression results for the relationships between healthcare user charges in 1991 SEK and the log(odds ratios) from stage 1 of having made a visit to 1 
a doctor. Time-varying effects are adjusted for by including Year as a control variable in the second model. 2 
 3 
 4 
 
All 
  
With good health (Group A1+B1) 
 
Not good health (Group A2+B2) 
 
 
Coefficient 95% CI R2 Coefficient 95% CI R2 Coefficient 95% CI R2 
Not adjusted for time-varying effects 
Constant 0.753** (0.503, 1.002) 0.735 0.188 (-0.067, 0.443) 0.411 -0.738 (-0.378,  -0.097) 0.095 
User charge -0.009** (-0.012, -0.006) 
 
-0.002 (-0.005, 0.001) 
 
0.006 (-0.001, 0.013) 
 
Adjusted for time-varying effects 
Constant 4.9 (-20.691, 30.492) 0.721 -16.032 (-40.794, 8.731) 0.908 3.867 (-69.989, 69.723) 0.039 
User charge -0.009** (-0.014, -0.003) 
 
-0.005 (-0.010, 0.001) 
 
0.007 (-0.008, 0.021) 
 
Year -0.002 (-0.015, 0.011) 
 
0.008 (-0.004, 0.021) 
 
-0.002 (-0.036, 0.031) 
 
Adjusted for higher education rate and time-varying effects 
Constant 5.175 (-43.288, 53.636) 0.702 -0.983 (-45.892, 40.393) 0.076 -10.126 (-83.857, 63.604) 0.032 
User charge -0.009** (-0.015, -0.002) 
 
-0.006 (-0.011, -0.000) 
 
0.006 (-0.008, 0.021) 
 
Year -0.002 (-0.027, 0.022) 
 
0.001 (-0.022, 0.023) 
 
0.004 (-0.032, 0.042) 
 High 
Education 
Rate 0.000 (-0.038, 0.039) 
 
0.001 (-1.910, 4.501) 
 
-1.396 (-4.577, 1.785) 
  5 
** Adjusted p < 0.05 6 
 7 
15 
 
 1 
Table 4 shows that there were no clear correlations between the user charge and 2 
inequalities in access to healthcare for any health-status group. The correlation coefficients for 3 
user charges were all very low (never greater than -0.009), meaning that changes to user 4 
charges have a miniscule relation to odds ratios of healthcare visits. This is in keeping with 5 
the results from Stage 1, as inequalities in access remained fairly stable despite the increase in 6 
user charges. The regression coefficient for the relationship between user charge and 7 
inequality remained similar in all groups when adjusted for time and for the proportion of 8 
higher educated in the population, which indicates that the relationship was due to user 9 
charges and not to other time-varying factors. The r2 value was smaller than for those with 10 
Not good health, meaning that user charges can explain less of the variance in inequalities in 11 
healthcare access in those with Not good health than in those with Good health. 12 
Discussion 13 
The results presented here show that overall, the less educated are slightly more likely 14 
to seek healthcare in Sweden, but among those with Not good health the more educated are 15 
slightly more likely to seek healthcare. Since the rates of Not good health are higher among 16 
the lower educated, the greater use of healthcare by those with lower education is probably 17 
due to their greater need. Among people with similar needs, however, the higher educated are 18 
more likely to seek healthcare. It may well be that the user charge for healthcare contributes to 19 
this inequality, or at least does nothing to ameliorate it. For those with Good health, there was 20 
little difference between the groups in the frequency of having sought healthcare.  21 
User charges are expected to be one factor that deters people from seeking care, and it is 22 
also expected that this deterrent effect is greatest among those with lower socio-economic 23 
status [25]. The work presented here shows that the link between the magnitude of user 24 
charges and inequalities in healthcare access in Sweden is lowest among those with Not good 25 
health. These are the people who are more likely to have a greater need for healthcare, which 26 
may be why there is a smaller association with user charges. Another factor that may lead to 27 
less price-sensitivity among those with Not good health is the existence in the Swedish system 28 
of a maximum amount that any person is required to pay for healthcare in one calendar year 29 
regardless of income. This cap was introduced in some counties during the 1970s and 30 
nationally in 1981. The cap covers primary and secondary outpatient care and is set at a level 31 
of SEK 1,100. One primary care visit costs approximately SEK 200 and a specialist outpatient 32 
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visit costs approximately SEK 350. This probably matters more to those with Not good 1 
health, as they are more likely to consume healthcare above this maximum amount. The 2 
protections provided within the Swedish system may thus have buffered against too hard an 3 
adverse effect on access for those most in need, despite no specific provision covering 4 
healthcare costs for the poorest. They also serve to limit the effects of recommodification. 5 
Our results show that user charges explained more of the variance in healthcare usage 6 
between educational groups among those with Good health (Groups A1+B1) than those with 7 
Not good health (Groups A2+B2). Those with Good health are expected to be more price-8 
sensitive, as the healthcare they seek is probably non-emergency, preventative, or 9 
unnecessary. The latter is healthcare that user charges are intended to deter. Our results 10 
indicate that the educational difference in price sensitivity is larger among those with Good 11 
health than Not good health. It is also less probable that those with Good health will seek 12 
enough care in one year to rise above the maximum level, meaning that this will probably not 13 
have as great an effect on their consumption of healthcare. However, the change in inequality 14 
in access is quite small, even in this group. Similarly, the overall proportion of people who 15 
have sought care does not decrease as user charges increase, which indicates that people are 16 
not very sensitive to the price of healthcare. It is possible that the user charge increase was too 17 
small to affect people’s behaviour, as the rate adjusted for inflation was stable throughout the 18 
1990s and early 2000s. There was a slight increase (from an odds ratio of 0.8 to 1) in 19 
inequalities in access to healthcare in the group with Not good health in the years 1993-1995, 20 
when Sweden was undergoing a severe economic crisis. This may have contributed to the 21 
increase in inequalities in access, as in hard times those with lower education might be less 22 
inclined to access healthcare. 23 
Our findings do not agree with previous results obtained by Burström [22], in that we 24 
have found only a limited  association between increases in user charges and inequalities in 25 
healthcare access. However, Burström measured having needed but not sought medical care, 26 
and the effect of increases in the user charge was most apparent among low-income groups. 27 
Access to healthcare is a complex issue that depends on many factors, and it may be that the 28 
user charge has not yet risen to levels at which it outweighs other considerations, such as need 29 
and accessibility. Our finding that the group with Not good health is the least price-sensitive 30 
supports this speculation. A previous study found that 20% of those who had needed but not 31 
sought medical care did so for economic reasons [23], and investigating whether this 32 
proportion differed by socioeconomic or health status would give an indication as to the 33 
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extent price sensitivity depends on socio-economic and health status. This could also be 1 
investigated in a time perspective, to see whether or not this is related to recommodification. 2 
This study has used different indicators of socio-economic status from those used by 3 
others. We measured socio-economic status by education, whereas previous studies have 4 
measured it mainly by income or occupation. User charges are more likely to influence 5 
inequalities in access by income, whereas education tends to have more influence in the 6 
evaluation of need, and in knowing when and how to seek appropriate care. It may be that 7 
there are smaller differences in the educational factors that influence healthcare access in the 8 
Swedish healthcare system, such as knowledge of how to gain access to it. This would explain 9 
the differences between this study and those, such as Burström [22], that found that health 10 
inequalities in the 1990s were greater than in the 1980s. Education may be a less accurate 11 
reflection of price-sensitivity than income, so by measuring changes in access by education 12 
status, we may have missed changes by income status. It can, however, be argued that 13 
education is a better long-term measure of socio-economic status, as it rarely changes once 14 
initial education is completed. 15 
Recommodification occurred during the period studied not only in the form of increases 16 
in user charges, but also through reforms that allowed private healthcare providers to establish 17 
a practice and that allowed people to choose their healthcare provider in the public system, to 18 
a limited extent. A healthcare market was created, and thus the limited choice reforms can be 19 
regarded as a recommodifying measure. It is also the case that the state no longer guarantees 20 
equal access to equal care in a choice system: the quality of care depends on the patient’s 21 
choice of provider. More highly educated patients are often better able to understand and 22 
navigate the system and make demands, leading to concerns that the choice reforms favoured 23 
more highly educated patients [26, 27]. However, we have seen no evidence of this in our 24 
study, as inequalities in healthcare access did not increase when the choice reforms were 25 
implemented. Most counties in Sweden adopted choice reforms during the time period 26 
studied, yet inequalities in access to healthcare as a consequence of different levels of 27 
education did not increase during this period. 28 
Limitations 29 
The limitations in this study are related mainly to problems with data access. Our 30 
measures of socio-economic status and need were restricted by the available definitions in 31 
ULF, and information about the level of care and geographical location was missing from our 32 
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data. We did not have an adequate measure of income, and thus used education as our 1 
measure of socio-economic status. We were also unable to compare health inequalities 2 
between counties in Sweden. We also had few pre-1991 data points and none beyond 2005.  3 
Our measure of need (self-reported Good or Not good health) is unable to pick up 4 
gradations of need. Furthermore, people might value their health differently, and two 5 
respondents with the same objective need for healthcare might have rated their health 6 
differently. 7 
The dichotomisation of having accessed care means that we likely miss nuances in care 8 
usage, especially between low and high users. Our measure captures any kind of contact with 9 
a doctor, for any purpose and at any level of care. There may have been differences in the 10 
kind of care that was sought (relief for temporary health issues, urgent care, preventative care, 11 
or unnecessary care) that we were not able to detect with our measure of healthcare use. 12 
Furthermore, we did not distinguish between primary and secondary care in the study, and the 13 
factors that drive people to seek care might differ at different levels of care. There are 14 
differences in the ways that counties in Sweden arrange healthcare, which mean that some 15 
care that is provided by specialists in one county is provided by primary care practitioners in 16 
another county.  17 
Conclusions 18 
The introduction of user charges in Sweden recommodified healthcare, in that it led to a 19 
requirement for out-of-pocket payment when accessing healthcare. However, the increases in 20 
user charges that took place between 1980 and 2005 were not linked to increased educational 21 
inequalities in healthcare access. Healthcare access is, however, unequal between groups with 22 
different levels of education, and different health needs. Within the general population, those 23 
with least education tend to use healthcare more than those with more education, but the 24 
pattern is different for those with higher health needs. In the latter case, healthcare usage is 25 
more common among the more highly educated. It is probable that reforms such as increases 26 
to user charges contribute to this inequality, or at least do nothing to ameliorate it. However, 27 
we found only a weak association between increases in user charges and inequalities in access 28 
to healthcare. This was probably due to some of the protections within the Swedish system, 29 
such as charge caps that protect those with the highest health needs from large charges. 30 
Furthermore, the user charges were moderate relative to the average wage. This is an 31 
important caveat for other countries that are considering introducing or raising user charges. 32 
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Healthcare usage was not very price-sensitive, at least at the level of user charges in Swedish 1 
healthcare from the 1980s-2000s. However, this says very little about charges set at other 2 
levels, and evidence from other studies suggests that higher user charges reduce healthcare 3 
usage, especially among lower income groups [11, 20-22]. Sweden provides an example of 4 
the emerging recommodification of healthcare, and aspects of health equity should be 5 
considered when studying future trends.   6 
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